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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-3266 
___________ 
 
KARIM AHMED DAOUD MAHMOUD SALEM, 
a/k/a David Daoud, a/k/a Karim Daoyd, 
   Petitioner 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A098-493-273) 
Immigration Judge:  Dorothy Harbeck 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 21, 2012 
Before:  SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR. and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 28, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 Karim Ahmed Daoud Mahmoud Salem (“Daoud”) petitions for review of an order 
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion to reopen his removal 
proceedings.  We will deny the petition for review. 
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 Because the parties are familiar with the background, we will present it in brief 
summary.  Daoud is a native and citizen of Egypt.  He entered the United States in May 
2004 as a B-1 nonimmigrant visitor for business, with authorization to remain in the 
United States until June 17, 2004.  Daoud began working without authorization of the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and did not depart the United States by June 
17, 2004.  DHS charged him with removability for remaining in the United States longer 
than permitted (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B)) and for failing to comply with the conditions 
of his nonimmigrant status (8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(C)).  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) 
sustained the removability charges and concluded that the only relief available to Daoud 
was voluntary departure.  The IJ did not immediately enter a decision granting voluntary 
departure.  Instead, the IJ granted continuances so that Daoud could retain counsel, and--
after Daoud presented proof of his marriage to a United States citizen--to allow Daoud 
and his wife to pursue an I-130 immigrant visa petition so that he could apply to adjust 
his immigration status.  Ultimately, Citizenship and Immigration Services (“CIS”) denied 
the visa petition that had been filed on Daoud’s behalf. 
 Daoud’s immigration proceedings were reopened in 2008, and he obtained 
representation by counsel.  After a hearing, in December 2008, the IJ entered a decision 
granting voluntary departure within thirty days, with an alternate order of removal to 
Egypt.  Daoud appealed that decision to the BIA, alleging that his immigrant visa petition 
had been re-filed with CIS and that the matter should be remanded to the IJ.  On June 29, 
2010, the BIA dismissed Daoud’s appeal, noting that Daoud failed to include any 
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evidence regarding that visa petition, failed to identify any errors in the IJ’s decision, and 
failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status.  The BIA granted 
Daoud an additional sixty days to depart the United States voluntarily. 
 On August 9, 2010, Daoud filed a “motion to reopen” with the BIA, claiming that 
the IJ refused to permit Daoud’s then-wife to file a new immigrant visa petition.1
 On February 25, 2011, Daoud filed a “motion to reconsider” with the BIA.  In the 
motion, he explained his new circumstances, including his divorce from his first wife, his 
marriage to another United States citizen with whom he had a child, and his pending 
immigrant visa petition filed on his behalf by his current wife.  Daoud submitted 
documentation in support of his motion.  On July 28, 2011, the BIA denied the motion.  
The BIA noted that Daoud did not identify any error of fact or law, as is required under 
8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(2), for a motion to reconsider.  Because Daoud sought to introduce 
  In its 
January 26, 2011 decision, the BIA noted that Daoud alleged no new facts and essentially 
asserted only that the BIA erred in its prior decision.  Thus construing the motion as a 
motion to reconsider rather than a motion to reopen, the BIA denied the motion, 
concluding that it was untimely and, in any event, failed to demonstrate any error or basis 
for reconsideration. 
                                              
1  The filing of Daoud’s motion automatically terminated the grant of voluntary 
departure, and the alternate order of removal to Egypt immediately took effect.  See 
8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(c)(3)(iii), (e)(1).  Cf. Patel v. Att’y Gen., 619 F.3d 230, 234-35 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (discussing automatic termination of the grant of voluntary departure upon 
filing of a petition for review). 
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new evidence and sought a new hearing, the BIA determined that the motion was, in 
substance, a motion to reopen.  As such, under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) and 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(2), the motion to reopen should have been filed within ninety days of the 
final administrative order.  In Daoud’s case, the final administrative order was the June 
29, 2010 order dismissing his appeal from the IJ’s decision.  The BIA concluded that the 
motion was untimely and did not fall within any statutory or regulatory exception to the 
deadline.  The BIA also declined to exercise its discretionary authority to reopen the 
proceedings sua sponte. 
 This petition for review followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252 to review the BIA’s denial of Daoud’s motion to reopen, and we apply the abuse 
of discretion standard to our review.  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft,  290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  Thus, to succeed on his petition for review, Daoud must show that the BIA’s 
decision was somehow arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.  See id. 
 Daoud makes no such showing here.  As an initial matter, we note that the petition 
for review pertains to the BIA’s July 28, 2011 decision only.  To the extent that Daoud’s 
arguments concern the underlying December 2008 decision by the IJ, we lack jurisdiction 
to review the arguments because Daoud did not file a timely petition for review of the 
BIA’s June 2010 decision affirming the IJ’s decision.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1); Stone 
v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995).  Further, Daoud 
presents no argument to challenge the BIA’s dispositive findings that Daoud’s “motion to 
reconsider” was in the nature of a motion to reopen, and as such, it was untimely.  We 
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thus deem any challenges to these issues to be waived.  See Dwumaah v. Att’y Gen., 
609 F.3d 586, 589 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 532 n.1 (3d 
Cir. 2005)).  Daoud does argue that the BIA’s decision denying reopening was arbitrary 
and capricious, because the new evidence of the new events in his life must be considered 
as a matter of fairness.  See Pet’r Br. at 5-6.  However, we are without jurisdiction to 
review the BIA’s exercise of discretionary authority to reopen the proceedings sua 
sponte.  See Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 474-75 (3d Cir. 2003).  See also 
Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 159 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (noting that Kucana v. Holder, 
558 U.S. 233, 130 S. Ct. 827, 839 n.18 (2010), did not affect our precedent dictating that 
we generally lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening).2
 Finally, we note that Daoud has filed a motion to remand the proceedings.  In 
support, he states that an immigrant visa petition filed on his behalf was recently 
approved, and his application for adjustment of status to that of a permanent resident is 
pending before CIS.  We will deny the motion.  The evidence of the recently approved 
immigrant visa petition and pending application to adjust status is beyond the scope of 
our review, as the documents are not contained in the administrative record.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(4)(A).  Moreover, the new circumstances do not impact the validity of the 
BIA’s decision to deny Daoud’s motion to reopen as untimely. 
 
                                              
2  We do have jurisdiction to review whether the BIA has applied an incorrect legal 
premise in its decision to deny sua sponte reopening.  See Pllumi, 642 F.3d at 160.  Such 
is not the case here, where the BIA’s determination was based on its determination that 
no “exceptional” circumstance was present. 
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 For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition for review.  Daoud’s motion 
to remand is denied.   
 
 
 
 
